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ZACHARY S. GILREATH* 
The Culprit of the Great Recession: A Detailed 
Explanation of Mortgage-Backed Securities, their 
Impact on the 2008 Financial Crisis, and the Legal 
Aftermath  
“What we know about the world financial crisis is that we don’t know very much.”1 
Though not a prophet, economist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Paul A. Samuelson2 
recognized in 1999 that financial market meltdowns are extremely difficult to predict 
or understand. Sure enough, the United States’ failure to recognize an imminent 
financial meltdown resulted in the worst housing market collapse3 since the Great 
Depression.4 While many factors led to what is commonly referred to as the Financial 
Crisis of 2008,5 the securitization of residential mortgages by financial institutions is 
arguably the chief culprit.6  
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 1. The “Other” Samuelson, THE GLOBALIST (Apr. 18, 2001), https://www.theglobalist.com/the-other-
samuelson/.  
 2. Paul A. Samuelson – Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic 
-sciences/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). Samuelson won the Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1970. Id.  
 3. Joel Havemann, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Year in Review 2008, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https:// 
www.britannica.com/topic/Financial-Crisis-of-2008-The-1484264 (last updated Feb. 2, 2009).  
 4. The Great Recession is a term that represents the sharp decline in economic activity during the late 
2000s. This period of time is also commonly referred to as the Financial Crisis of 2008. The Great Recession, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 5. Some economists argue that factors such as lenient lending standards, overconfidence of financial 
institutions, and outright fraud were all factors that led to the financial meltdown. Max Ehrenfreund, Think You 
Know the Cause of the US Financial Crisis? You Could be Wrong, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/the-cause-of-the-us-financial-crisis-wasnt-what-you-think-
according-to-these-economists.  
 6. Havemann, supra note 3.  
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 This paper will provide a detailed explanation of the history of mortgage-
backed securities (“MBS”), the Financial Crisis of 2008, and the impact MBS has had 
on securities litigation nationwide. Part I will explain how mortgages have progressed 
within the United States and detail the creation of the first MBS.7 Part II will discuss 
the growth of the MBS market and innovations that followed, looking at those that 
had an impact on the crisis.8 Part III will examine the Financial Crisis of 2008 and 
how the MBS market was impacted by the housing market collapse.9 Finally, Part IV 
analyzes securities litigation prior to 2007-08 and litigation following the financial 
crisis, focusing on how the posture of courts has evolved with respect to claims 
brought by shareholders.10  
I. THE CREATION OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
In order to understand the mortgage-backed security market and the risky 
innovations that followed, one must first understand the progression of the mortgage 
and the government entities created to monitor mortgage lending. Subsection A 
briefly discusses mortgages and how they progressed until the government began 
establishing government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) to focus on the rising costs of 
homeownership.11 Subsection B offers background knowledge regarding GSEs, 
mortgage programs that eventually established the first mortgage-backed security.12 
Finally, subsection C explains how and why GSEs began issuing mortgage-backed 
securities. 13 
A. What is a Mortgage? 
A mortgage is a debt instrument secured by the collateral of specified real estate 
property that the borrower is obliged to pay back with a predetermined set of 
payments.14 Individuals and businesses use mortgages to make large real estate 
purchases without paying the entire value of the purchase at one time.15 In a 
residential mortgage, a homebuyer pledges his or her house to the bank.16 The bank 
has a claim on the house should the homebuyer default on paying the mortgage.17 
 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. Mortgage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mortgage.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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  Prior to the Great Depression, homeowners typically renegotiated the terms of 
their mortgages every year.18 During that period, mortgages had very low loan-to-
value ratios and did not place substantial stress on lenders.19 However, during the 
Great Depression, property values plummeted, forcing mortgage holders to refuse to 
refinance loans that came due—this led to millions of borrowers defaulting and 
homes being foreclosed on by holders.20 At the peak of the financial crisis, nearly 10 
percent of homes were in foreclosure.21 
 In response to the problems created during the Great Depression, the United 
States government began intervening in the housing finance market. As well as 
establishing a number of mortgage programs and institutions discussed below, the 
government also invented the fixed-rate, self-amortizing, long-term mortgage.22 The 
addition of the government in the home financing arena helped establish numerous 
programs that helped alleviate some costs associated with home buying, but also led 
to problems that will I will address in the following sections.  
B. Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
In 1933, the U.S. government established the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”) mortgage insurance program.23 In 1944, the Veteran Administration 
(“VA”) mortgage guarantee program was established.24 Both of these programs 
provided a federal guarantee for mortgage investors, as was typical for government 
entities.25  
 In 1938, The Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”), more 
commonly referred to as “Fannie Mae,” was created.26 By 1968 the FNMA was 
privatized as a shareholder-owned entity with the right to buy and sell both 
government-sponsored and non-government-sponsored loans so long as the loans 
met certain guidelines.27 Much like the mortgage guarantee houses of the 1800s, 
Fannie Mae issued bonds to support its loan purchases.28   
 
 18. Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 
19 J. OF ECON. PERSP., no. 4, 2005, at 93, 93.  
 19. Id. at 94. 
 20. Id. From 1931 until 1935, 250,000 homes were foreclosed on annually. Id. 
 21. Id. at 94–95. 
 22. Id. at 95.  
 23. John McConnell & Stephen A. Buser, The Origins and Evolution of the Market for Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, 3 ANN. REV. FINANC. ECON., 2011, at 173, 176. 
 24. Id. at 176.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
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 In 1968, the federal government established the Government National 
Mortgage Association (“GNMA”), also known as “Ginnie Mae.”29 Two years later, 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“FHLMC”) was created.30 Today, the 
FHLMC is more commonly referred to as “Freddie Mac.”31 As with Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac was established as a shareholder-owned corporation with no explicit 
government guarantee,32 although most investors viewed Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac as having an implicit government guarantee.33 Ginnie Mae was chartered for a 
different reason: to issue mortgage-backed securities supported by FHA and VA 
mortgage loans and to guarantee timely payment of interest and principal loans used 
to support Ginnie Mae MBS.34 
 Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac are all considered government-
sponsored enterprises.35 A GSE consists of privately held corporations with public 
purposes created by the U.S. Congress to reduce the cost of capital for certain 
borrowing sectors of the economy.36 GSEs carry the implicit backing of the U.S. 
government, but they are not direct obligations of the U.S. government.37 For this 
reason, these securities will offer a yield premium over Treasuries.38 These GSEs 
focusing on mortgages were established because some thought that a national 
mortgage market would reduce the cost of home ownership by creating a more liquid 
market.39  
C. Mortgage-Backed Securities 
The mortgage-backed security was created in an attempt to further reduce the cost 
of home financing.40 In 1968, Ginnie Mae provided assistance in the form of a 
guarantee for a privately issued mortgage-backed security.41 The first MBS offered by 
 
 29. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 176.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Kimberly Amadeo, What is Freddie Mac?, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-freddie-mac-
3305985 (last updated Mar. 31, 2017). 
 32. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 176. 
 33. This view was substantiated in 2008 when both entities were placed into conservatorship under the 
auspices of the United States government. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 174.  
 36. Government-Sponsored Enterprise – GSE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ g/gse. 
asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 37. Only loans that meet certain criteria are acceptable for securitization under the auspices of GSEs. 
McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 174.  
 38. Government-Sponsored Enterprise – GSE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ g/gse. 
asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 39. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 177.  
 40. Id. at 177–8. 
 41. Id. at 176.  
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Ginnie Mae itself was in 1970 with a face value of $70 million.42 Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae issued their first MBS in 1971 and 1981, respectively.43   
 A mortgage-backed security (“MBS”)44 is a type of asset-backed security that is 
secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages.45 An MBS can be bought and sold 
through a broker and is issued by a federal government agency, GSE, or private 
financial company.46 When an investor invests in an MBS, he is essentially lending 
money to a homebuyer or business.47 An MBS is a way for a smaller regional bank to 
lend mortgages to its customers without having to worry about whether the 
customers have the assets to cover the loan.48 Instead, the bank acts as an 
intermediary between the homebuyer and the investment market participants.49 
MBSs benefit the banks that sell them because they can be removed from the balance 
sheet, allowing such banks to acquire additional funding.50 
 The process by which mortgages are pooled together to form MBS is quite 
sophisticated, which is why those who invest in MBSs typically put in a good deal of 
research to ensure that their investment matches their risk tolerance.51 First, 
mortgage loans are purchased from banks or mortgage companies and are then 
assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity.52 The 
entity then issues securities that represent claims on principal and interest payments 
made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process known as securitization.53 
Some private institutions, such as brokerage firms and banks, also securitize 
mortgages, known as “private-label” mortgage securities.54   
 There are two common types of MBS. The first type of MBS issued by Ginnie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae are pass-through MBS, in which investors receive 
a pro rata fraction of monthly principal and interest payments from the underlying 
 
 42. Id. at 176–7. 
 43. Id. at 177.  
 44. An MBS is also known as a “mortgage-related security” or a “mortgage pass through.” Mortgage-Backed 
Security (MBS), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Alexandra Yan, Introduction to Asset-Backed and Mortgage-Backed Securities, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/12/introduction-asset-backed-securities.asp (last visited April 23, 2017). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Fast Answers: Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ 
fast-answers/answersmortgagesecuritieshtm.html (last updated July 23, 2010).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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loans.55 The second type of MBS, which developed as the MBS market grew, are 
collateralized mortgage or debt obligations.56 
II. The Mortgage-Backed Securities Market 
The creation of the mortgage-backed security allowed lenders to sell the mortgages 
they made, thus replenishing their available capital and allowing them to lend again.57 
Because of the flexibility MBS offered lenders and the government guarantee 
implicitly given to the MBS issued by GSEs, the market grew exponentially. By 2010, 
the MBS had grown further, with outstanding issuance exceeding $9 trillion.58 
Furthermore, the growth of the MBS market led to growth in other financial 
securities,59 such as asset-backed securities.60  
 As time progressed, the MBS market evolved and became more complex. The 
complexity and privatization of MBS arguably led to eventual economic turmoil the 
United States faced beginning in 2007. Subsection A discusses how the structure of 
MBS became more complex through the creation of collateral mortgage obligations.61 
Subsection B explains the emergence of the private sector in the MBS business.62 
A. The Creation of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations  
Freddie Mac issued the first collateralized mortgage obligation in 1983 and Fannie 
Mae issued its first collateralized mortgage obligation in 1985.63 Collateralized 
mortgage obligations (“CMOs”), sometimes generally referred to as collateralized 
debt obligations (“CDOs”), allocate the cash flows from the MBS into tranches64 that 
 
 55. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 173, 177. 
 56. See infra Part II.A. 
 57. Chris Wilson, What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/03/what_is_a_mortgagebacked_security.html.  
 58. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 173.  
 59. “For example, the first financial futures contract initiated in 1974 was backed by an MBS issued by Ginnie 
Mae (GNMA). As of 2011, trading in financial futures contracts comprised more than 90% of the total volume of 
all futures contracts in the United States.” Id. at 174.   
 60. “Other types of asset-backed securities (ABS) including securities backed by credit card debts, 
automobile and student loans, and equipment leases have followed the blueprint laid by MBS.” Id. An asset-
backed security is a financial security back by a loan, lease, or receivable against assets other than real estate and 
MBS. Asset-Backed Security – ABS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asset-backed security. 
asp (last visited Apr 23, 2017). 
 61. See infra Part II.A. 
 62. See infra Part II.B. 
 63. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 177.  
 64. Tranches are pieces, portions or slices of debt or structured financing. Each portion, or tranche, is one 
of several related securities offered at the same time but with different risks, rewards and maturities. For example, 
a CMO offering a partitioned MBS portfolio might have mortgage tranches with one-year, two-year, five-year 
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allow investors to choose among a wide array of payoff patterns.65 These more 
complicated MBSs are designed to protect investors from or expose investors to 
various types of risk.66   
 Initially, MBS faced only one type of risk: prepayment risk. Prepayment risk is 
the risk associated with the early, unscheduled return of principal on a fixed-income 
security.67 Because of their long maturities, mortgages are susceptible to this risk.68 If 
rates rise dramatically, the price of the bond can decline suddenly and the investor 
can suffer significant losses in value.69 However, some fixed-rate mortgages can be 
paid off at any time, meaning if interest rates decline, mortgagors have an incentive 
to pay off their loans early so as to refinance at a lower rate loan.70 Paying off a loan 
prior to maturity is known as the borrower’s prepayment option.71 If a borrower pays 
off their loan before maturity, the holder of an MBS will not receive the anticipated 
stream of income at the agreed upon interest rate and will now have to reinvest their 
capital presumably at a lower interest rate.  
 The creation of CMOs was a way of overcoming the disadvantages of simple 
MBS in that an investor who preferred a short-term security could buy an early 
tranche, whereas one who was willing to bear more risk (possibly in return for a 
higher yield) would be attracted to the later pay tranches.72 The CMOs were 
structured so that the first tranche would receive all principal payments and interest 
from the underlying loans until the principal amount of the tranche was paid off.73 
Once the first tranche was paid off, the payments were disbursed to the second 
tranche.74 Each tranche received its pro rata share of monthly interest payments 
based on the remaining principal outstanding in the tranche and the tranche’s stated 
coupon rate.75 These types of payoff structures were known as sequential pay bonds.76  
 
and 20-year, all with varying degrees of risk and return. Tranches, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/t/tranches.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 65. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 174. 
 66. Fast Answers: Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec. 
gov/fast-answers/answersmortgagesecuritieshtm.html (last updated July 23, 2010).  
 67. Prepayment Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prepaymentrisk.asp (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 68. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 177.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 178.  
 73. Id. at 177.  
 74. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 177. 
 75. Id. A coupon rate is the yield paid by a fixed-income security; a fixed-income security’s coupon rate is 
simply just the annual coupon payments paid by the issuer relative to the bond’s face or par value. Coupon Rate, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/coupon-rate.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 76. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 177.  
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 Today, prepayment risk is not the only risk associated with MBS. As the private 
sector became a significant player in the MBS market over time, the structure of 
CMOs underwent significant innovation that added inherent risks. 
B. The Emergence of the Private Sector 
The growth of the MBS market in the 1990s brought with it not only innovation, but 
also competition. Though GSEs dominated the MBS market for nearly twenty years, 
the success of the MBS and the growth of the housing market77 attracted private-label 
issuers like banks and other financial institutions.78  
 While early CMOs were all backed by GSE insured or guaranteed mortgages, 
private label CMOs emerged in the mid-to-late 1990s.79 As previously stated, GSEs 
carry with them an implicit government guarantee—the government bears the risk 
that mortgagors on the underlying loans will default.80 However, investors in private 
label CMOs bear the risk that mortgagors will default.81 This risk was compounded 
due to the differences associated with GSE and private-label CMOs. 
 Government-sponsored enterprises can only securitize loans that meet certain 
criteria.82 These loans are referred to as conforming.83 Private-label loans that are 
securitized do not meet these same standards; they are known as non-conforming 
loans.84 Non-conforming loans consists of subprime and Alt-A loans,85 which were 
created due to the higher demand for mortgages upon the addition of private 
financial services institutions into the MBS market. Typically, mortgagors only 
provided loans to prime borrowers, or those who had good credit and a steady source 
of income.86 However, increasing the supply of mortgages available to be pooled into 
private-label MBS or CMOs forced mortgage lenders to loosen their typically strict 
 
 77. The proportion of households that owned their home increased from 64 percent that had prevailed in 
the 1970s to 69 percent by early 2006. JUNIOR ACHIEVEMENT USA, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. HOUSING 
MARKET: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 3 (2009), https://www.juniorachievement.org/documents/20009/ 
36541/Housing-Market-paper.pdf/63e03a3a-9561-4532-be0a-4311141ddb67. 
 78. Private label offerings accounted for approximately 10% of the less than $500 million of MBS issuances 
in 1996. By 1998, MBS issuances had nearly doubled to $1 trillion, with private label offerings accounting for 
almost 40%. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 179. 
 79. Id. at 178. 
 80. Government-Sponsored Enterprise – GSE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ g/gse.asp 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 81. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 178.  
 82. Id. at 174.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. Alt-A loans are those in which the risk profile falls between prime and subprime. The borrowers will 
typically have clean credit histories, but the mortgage itself will generally have issues that impact its risk profile. 
Alt-A, INVESTOPEDIA. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alt-a.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 86. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 180.  
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lending standards, allowing those with poorer credit or no dependable source of 
income to receive home financing.87 Mortgage dealers began issuing mortgages with 
terms unfavorable to borrowers, who were often families that did not qualify for 
ordinary home loans.88 Some of these so-called subprime mortgages89 carried low 
“teaser” interest rates in the early years that ballooned to double-digit rates in later 
years.90 Some included prepayment penalties that made it prohibitively expensive to 
refinance.91   
 In 1969, the rate of homeownership in the United States stood at 64.3 percent.92 
As of 1993, the rate stood at 64 percent.93 However, beginning in 1994 when the 
private sector became involved in the MBS market and mortgage lenders began to 
provide subprime and Alt-A loans, the rate of home ownership increased until it 
reached its peak of 69 percent in 2006.94 Subprime and near-prime loans shot up from 
9 percent of newly originated securitized mortgages in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006.95 
In summary, millions of subprime mortgages were being issued even though these 
non-conforming loans lacked the same implicit guarantee provided to loans issued 
by GSEs.96 
 The addition of private-label MBS opened the door for other private financial 
institutions to become involved in the lucrative market. For example, insurance 
companies entered the game by trading in credit default swaps.97 However, these 
derivatives were often bought or sold by financial institutions on assets that they did 
not own, adding to the risk associated with private-label CMOs.98 The actions of 
credit rating agencies compounded these risks. As with all loans, MBS and CMOs are 
 
 87. Id. at 181. 
 88. Havemann, supra note 3.  
 89. Subprime mortgages are extended to applicants deemed the least creditworthy because of low credit 
scores or uncertain income prospects, both of which reflect the highest default risks and warrant the highest 
interest rates.” Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, 2 ECONOMIC 
LETTER, no. 11, Nov. 2007, at 2.  
 90. Id. at 4.  
 91. Id.  
 92. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 180.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. DiMartino & Duca, supra note 89, at 2. 
 96. Id. at 2–3.  
 97. A credit default swap is a particular type of swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income 
products between two or more parties. In a credit default swap, the buyer of the swap makes payments to the 
swap’s seller up until the maturity date of a contract. In return, the seller agrees to pay the buyer the security’s 
premium and interest payments if the debt issuer defaults. Credit Default Swap – CDS, Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 98. Havemann, supra note 3. About $900 billion in credit was insured by credit default swaps in 2001, 
increasing to $62 trillion by the beginning of 2008. Id. 
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rated by a credit rating agency99 (“CRA”) based on their creditworthiness and the 
likelihood that the borrower(s) will pay back the loan within the confines of the 
agreement.100 All loans are assigned a grade ranging from AAA to D; AAA-rated 
loans are considered excellent while any rating below BBB- is considered a junk 
bond.101 
 As the private sector became involved in the MBS market, CRAs were necessary 
to provide ratings for individual MBS and every tranche of CMOs. The ratings 
assigned to tranches of CMOs were especially important when it came to private-
label CMOs because of the credit risk associated with subprime mortgages.102 Because 
tranches of subprime mortgages were more likely to reach default, CRAs were 
essential in assigning the correct tranche rating.103  
 However, many argue that CRAs “colluded with issuers and awarded inflated 
ratings to lesser quality MBS, thereby further misleading investors.”104 Credit rating 
agencies are paid by banks that request the CRA’s rating; in order to avoid losing 
customers to their competitors, CRAs had a strong incentive to issue high ratings to 
the banks’ securities.105 Additionally, because CMOs “were new instruments, CRAs 
had little history on which to base their analys[es].”106 Finally, CRAs often 
distinguished ratings based on the size of the issuer seeking ratings. Between 2004 
and 2006, ratings agencies granted unduly favorable ratings to large issuers at a 10 
percent higher clip as compared to smaller issuers.107  
 As a result, CRAs often gave high investment ratings to CDOs that were largely 
filled with assets that were backed up by high-risk subprime mortgages.108 Individuals 
who had invested in AAA-rated tranches, thought to provide the investor with 
excellent-risk protection, were in fact holding securities that left them incredibly 
vulnerable. The market for mortgage-backed securities, once created to decrease the 
cost of home financing, had quickly become a market overflowing with risk.  
 
 99. The three largest credit rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Credit Rating, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditrating.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. McConnell & Buser, supra note 23, at 175, 178. 
 103. Id. at 178. 
 104. Id. at 182.  
 105. Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble and the Financial Crisis, REAL-WORLD ECON. REV., no. 46, 2008, at 77. 
 106. Id. at 78.  
 107. Jie He, Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan, Credit Ratings and the Evolution of the Mortgage-backed Securities 
Market, 101 AMERICAN ECON. REV., no. 3, 2011, at 131, 134.  
 108. Baker, supra note 105, at 78. 
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III. The Financial Crisis of 2008  
While the MBS market exploded during the early 2000s, the success of mortgage-
backed securities experienced its demise in the late 2000s. Until 2006, the MBS 
market experienced growth not only due to the high volume of issuances,109 but also 
because the United States housing market was thriving. As housing prices kept rising, 
subprime mortgage holders with inadequate sources of regular income could borrow 
against their rising home equity in order to make mortgage payments and avoid 
default.110 Towards the end of 2006, however, the United States housing market 
bubble created by excessive lending began to burst; housing prices began to fall and 
subprime mortgage holders living above their means could no longer avoid default. 
At the end of September 2007, about three percent of home loans were in the 
foreclosure process111 and another seven percent of homeowners with a mortgage 
were at least one month past due on their payments.112  
 Subsection A delves into the housing bubble burst of 2007 and how it placed 
pressure on the financial services sector.113 Subsection B then discusses the aftermath 
of the MBS market crash and how the largest private-label MBS issuers struggled to 
stay afloat.114   
A. The Housing Bubble Burst: The Beginning of the End 
When the housing market is doing well, investing in MBS is a fairly safe bet. As long 
as mortgage holders keep up with payments, holders of MBS receive a stream of 
payments. But when the housing market begins to decline or interest rates rise, even 
the safest of these investments are in serious jeopardy. Rising interest rates reduce 
the value of mortgages. When borrowers default on mortgages, the stream of 
payments available to holders of MBS declines. “And when a firm [borrows] heavily 
to finance the purchase and trading of [MBS], it doesn’t take much of a fall in value 
to trigger serious problems.”115 
 While the housing market was strong through the 1990s and early 2000s, 
housing prices began to decline nationally by mid-2006, dropping by about 1.5 
 
 109. Total MBS issuances reached an all-time high of nearly $3.2 trillion in 2003. Private-label issuances 
continued to increase and reached an all-time high of more than $900 million in 2006. McConnell & Buser, supra 
note 23, at 179.  
 110. Havemann, supra note 3.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. 
 113. See infra Part III.A. 
 114. See infra Part III.B. 
 115. Chris Wilson, What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/03/what_is_a_mortgagebacked_security.html.  
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percent by 2007.116 This price decline came at a time when interest rates increased as 
over two million homeowners faced the first interest-rate resets on their adjustable-
rate mortgages.117 With default rates increasing, banks sought enforcement of 
repurchase agreements requiring lenders to buy back troubled mortgages.118 
Additionally, the unexpectedly high default rates on subprime mortgages caused 
credit rating agencies to downgrade their ratings of MBS and CMOs.119   
 Financial institutions were forced to write down their MBS and CMO 
investments as their value became impaired. These write-downs forced firms to seek 
capital to meet regulatory requirements by selling unwanted mortgage-related 
assets.120 Because so many firms were engaged in MBS issuance leading up to the 
housing market collapse, the market for selling these unwanted mortgage-related 
assets was illiquid, forcing firms to sell at a steep discount price.121 Raised fears 
regarding the creditworthiness of financial institutions ensued; this resulted in a run 
on the funding of banks—similar to what occurred in the Great Depression.122 
Providers of capital withdrew both secured and unsecured funding from banks.123 
There was a massive impact on the financial services sector.124 
B. Impact of the Crisis on the Financial Services Sector125 
While the aftermath of the financial crisis hurt most Americans and stretched 
globally, it was especially harmful to issuers of mortgage-backed securities.126 As was 
mentioned earlier, the popularity of MBS encouraged banks to set more lax credit 
requirements when providing mortgage loans in order to supply ever-eager MBS 
investors.127 When the housing market crashed and homeowners defaulted on their 
 
 116. Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007–08 Credit Crisis, 
in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECURITIZATION AFTER THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 163, 167 (Yasuyuki 
Fuchita, Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan eds., 2009). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Banks Go on Subprime Offensive, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2007, at A3.  
 119. Bethel et al., supra note 116, at 183. This led to a dramatic thinning in trading for subprime credit 
instruments, many of which carried synthetic, rather than market, values based on models because of the 
instruments’ illiquidity.” DiMartino & Duca, supra note 89, at 5–6. 
 120. Bethel et al., supra note 116, at 182–83. 
 121. Id. at 183–84. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra Part III.B. 
 125. For a detailed account of the Financial Crisis’ impact on numerous financial institutions, see Havemann, 
supra note 3.  
 126. See infra Part III.A.i–III.A.iii.  
 127. Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/ mbs.asp (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017). Individuals who possess good credit, make down payments, and have a steady stream of 
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subprime mortgage loans,128 issuers of subprime MBS and CMOs with tranches of 
subprime loans quickly realized these securities were overvalued.129 Aside from the 
problems associated with CMO overvaluation discussed previously,130 the use of 
special-purpose vehicles131 was also harmful due to the impact they had on security 
valuation.132 During the financial crisis, issuers of MBS realized that the MBS and 
CMOs held were not nearly as valuable as once thought.  
 While both agency and non-agency MBS issuers faced financial problems 
during the financial crisis, the largest issuers faced bankruptcy. In 2006, the MBS 
market was highly concentrated with the top five issuers accounting for 38% to 47% 
of all newly issued securities.133 By 2009, all five of these issuers faced severe financial 
trouble.134  
 The first of the five largest issuers to collapse was the top private MBS issuer in 
2006,135 Countrywide Financial Corporation.136 Countrywide, which was founded in 
1968 and had become the largest originator of single-family mortgages in the country 
by 1992,137 possessed more than $32.7 billion worth of pay-option adjustable-rate 
mortgages (“ARMs”), most of which were subprime.138 By March 2007, 23.7% of their 
subprime mortgages were delinquent.139 On August 23, 2007, Countrywide 
announced that Bank of America would invest $2 billion to help out the mortgage 
 
income typically receive prime mortgages. Mortgages given to those who fail to meet prime mortgage 
requirements are known as subprime or Alt-A mortgages. DiMartino & Buca, supra note 89, at 2. 
 128. “Subprime mortgages are extended to applicants deemed the least creditworthy because of low credit 
scores or uncertain income prospects, both of which reflect the highest default risk and warrant the highest 
interest rates.” DiMartino & Buca, supra note 89, at 2. 
 129. Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS), supra note 127. 
 130. See supra Part II.A.  
 131. A special-purpose vehicle/entity (“SPV”) is a subsidiary company with an asset/liability structure and 
legal status that makes its obligations secure even if the parent company goes bankrupt. An off-balance-sheet SPV 
documents its assets, liability, and equity on its own balance sheet rather than on the parent company’s balance 
sheet as equity or debt. Special Purpose Vehicle/Entity – SPV/SPE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/s/spv.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 132. Financial lenders preferred utilizing SPVs because their use allegedly placed lower risks on the lender 
and also led to higher credit ratings for securities issued. Id. 
 133. He et al., supra note 107, at 133. The top five issuers in 2006 were Countrywide, General Motors, Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and IndyMac. Id. 
 134. Timeline: Key events in financial crisis, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
business/2013/09/08/chronology-2008-financial-crisis-lehman/2779515/ (last modified Sep. 9, 2013).  
 135. He et al., supra note 107, at 133.  
 136. Havemann, supra note 3.  
 137. Scott Olster, How the roof fell in on Countrywide, FORTUNE (Dec. 23, 2010), http://fortune.com/2010/ 
12/23/how-the-roof-fell-in-on-countrywide/ (citing BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE 
HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2011)). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. 
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giant.140 However, the large loan given by Bank of America was not enough for 
Countrywide to survive; in January 2008, Bank of America was able to purchase 
Countrywide for only $4 billion.141  
 Other financial institutions like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns142 weren’t 
as lucky. During the housing boom in 2003 and 2004, Lehman acquired five 
mortgage lenders, including subprime lender BNC Mortgage and Aurora Loan 
Services, which specialized in Alt-A loans.143 This led to Lehman securitizing $146 
billion in mortgages during 2006, a 10% increase over the previous year.144 However, 
as the housing market began to collapse in 2007, so did Lehman’s stock price.145 
Stocks continued to fall throughout 2008, and coupled with Korea Development 
Bank’s failure to purchase a stake in the bank,146 Lehman was forced to declare 
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.147 
 As the MBS market dwindled and losses piled up as institutional investors 
attempted to unload bad MBS investments, the United States government was forced 
to make a decision. With the potential collapse of General Motors,148 the government 
initiated a plan to bail out the financial services sector. The U.S. Treasury stepped in 
with the $700 billion bailout to mitigate the credit crunch, but it was the Federal 
Reserve that led the charge on creating a market for unloading MBS.149 “The Federal 
Reserve bought $1.75 trillion in MBS directly while the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) injected capital into banks.”150 The crisis passed, but the total 
government commitment, implicit and explicit, was significantly larger than the $700 
billion figure often reported.151 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Havemann, supra note 3. 
 142. Bear Stearns had a thick portfolio of MBS and when the value of those securities plummeted, Bear Stearns 
was rescued from bankruptcy by JPMorgan Chase. The agreement was for $10/share, with the Federal Reserve 
agreeing to absorb up to $30 billion of Bear’s declining assets. Id. 
 143. Case Study: The Collapse of Lehman Brothers, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
economics/09/lehman-brothers-collapse.asp (last modified Feb. 16, 2017).  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Lehman stayed afloat thanks in large part to the hefty investment of $2 billion made by the Korean 
Development Bank. Id. However, the Korean Development Bank’s refused to take on anything more, especially 
in terms of management. Id.   
 147. Id. 
 148. General Motors filed its application for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 1, 2009. The Bankruptcy of 
General Motors: A Giant Falls, ECONOMIST (June 4, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13782942. 
 149. Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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IV. The Legal Aftermath of the Financial Crisis 
Beginning shortly after the burst of the Internet bubble in the early 2000s, courts 
began to see an increasing number of big-ticket securities cases152 that were intensely 
litigated, received publicity, and progressed far beyond the initial stages of 
litigation.153 These cases were typically “stock-drop” cases, brought by a class154 of 
shareholders who alleged “that the defendant corporation had experienced a decline 
in its share price after it was revealed that the corporation had allegedly made prior 
misrepresentations or fraudulent statements.”155  
 Following the failure of numerous financial institutions like Lehman Brothers 
and Bear Stearns, securities litigation shifted from targeting loan originators to 
targeting defendants involved in loan securitization.156 Initially, courts began to see a 
dramatic increase in the number of securities class action suits, namely stock-drop 
cases.157 Because of the write-downs of financial institutions,158 there was a significant 
rise in the number of securities class actions against a variety of participants in the 
market for subprime MBS and the complex derivative investments that sprung from 
that market.159 Most litigation has centered on whether investments were valued 
appropriately by the financial institutions that held them.160 Shareholders claimed 
that the devaluation of MBS and CMOs was effectively caused by misrepresentation, 
and sought to recover following the drop of stock prices of major financial 
institutions that held MBS and CMOs.161 However, the initial increase in securities 
litigation claims did not last long due to a number of appellate court decisions. 
 
 152. “Big-ticket” cases are those in which the damages sought far exceed any available liability insurance, 
where early settlement is rare. Daniel Slifkin, The Changing Landscape of Securities Litigation, NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION 2 (2014). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Stock-drop cases were usually security class action filings. Kathleen N. Massey, Securities Litigation 
Arising Out of the Financial Crisis: A Survey of Relevant Decisions and Their Implications, 16 THE INV. LAW., no. 
6, May 2009, at 2. 
 155. Slifkin, supra note 152, at 2.  
 156. Christopher J. Miller, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of Dismissal Rulings in 
10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 290 (2011). 
 157. According to recent reports, the number of securities class actions filed in 2008 was at its highest level 
since 2004, and there were at least 576 cases filed in 2008 relating to subprime mortgages and related issues. 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS–2008: A YEAR IN REVIEW (2009), 
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.pdf; GRACE LAMONT & PATRICIA A. ETZOLD, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY (2009); JEFF NIELSEN ET AL., SUBPRIME 
MORTGAGE AND RELATED LITIGATION – 2008: SEEKING RELIEF (2009), http://www.navigantconsulting.com/ 
downloads/knowledge_center/Navigant_2008_Credit_Crisis_Litigation_Report_Exec_Summary_Mar-09.pdf.  
 158. See DiMartino & Duca, supra note 89, at 2.  
 159. James C. Dugan, A Primer on Securities Litigation and Enforcement in an Economic Crisis, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 5–6 (2009).  
 160. Id. at 6. 
 161. Slifkin, supra note 152, at 2–3.  
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 In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,162 the Supreme Court formalized the 
requirement that misrepresentations must be the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s loss 
under Rule 10b-5.163 In reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Court reasoned 
that while purchasing a security at a price inflated by a misrepresentation, such as a 
MBS given a faulty AAA rating by a CRA, might lead to a later loss, it is far from 
invariably so.164 Rather, “that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances [or] changed investor 
expectations . . . which taken separately or together account for some or all of that 
lower price.”165   
 In Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,166 the Second Circuit delved further into the 
effect a non-fraud explanation might have on pleading loss causation.167 Establishing 
a two-part test for pleading loss causation, the court emphasized that proximate 
causation in securities fraud suits differs from causation in other torts because the 
loss is not directly caused by the defendant, but by the underlying circumstance that 
is concealed or misstated.168 The Second Circuit held that a plaintiff must plead “both 
that the loss be foreseeable and that the loss be caused by the materialization of the 
concealed risk.”169 It also noted that if a plaintiff’s loss “coincides with a market-wide 
phenomenon causing comparable losses to other investors, the prospect that the 
plaintiff’s loss was caused by the fraud decreases.”170 
 Finally, in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,171 the Supreme Court 
discussed the scienter requirement in securities fraud claims.172 In Tellabs, the Court 
held that the failure of defendant corporations to predict events that eventually 
contribute to the realization of losses does not constitute fraud.173 In the absence of 
allegations that the defendant’s actions were reckless in not perceiving these risks at 
the time they made their disclosures, plaintiffs did not adequately allege scienter.174 
 Based on the aforementioned appellate court decisions, the number of 
securities claims brought by class actions has decreased since 2009.175 Instead, 
 
 162. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).  
 163. Miller, supra note 156, at 285. 
 164. Dura, 544 U.S. at 336–8.  
 165. Id. at 343. 
 166. 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 167. Miller, supra note 156, at 286.  
 168. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 174 (quoting First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir. 1994)).  
 171. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).  
 172. Scienter is a mental state in fraud that is characterized by an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 
Scienter, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/scienter (last accessed Apr. 24, 2017).  
 173. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320 (citing Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978)).  
 174. Id. 
 175. Slifkin, supra note 152, at 2.  
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sophisticated individual plaintiffs have brought the majority of claims relating to the 
financial crisis.176 Based on Dura and Lentell, plaintiffs are now required to remove 
market movement from the equation and show a causal link between 
misrepresentations made by a financial institution and the alleged decrease in stock 
price.177 Because of Tellabs, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant 
corporations were reckless in failing to recognize the risks associated with MBS and 
CMOs; “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—
it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of non-
fraudulent intent.”178 However, the subprime crisis “has not easily lent itself to fraud, 
mainly because the assets that are at the heart of these cases tend to be complex and 
difficult to value.”179 As such, investors of MBS are typically institutional investors 
and use MBS to obtain higher yields than government bonds, as well as to provide a 
way to diversify their portfolios.180 Additionally, the unprecedented scale of the 
crisis181 and the uniformity of the decline in the value of MBS investments make it 
difficult for plaintiffs to prove their losses were a result of misrepresentation, as 
opposed to general market conditions.182 Finally, it is difficult to form a class when 
bringing a claim regarding MBS because each mortgage pool in an MBS is unique – 
every mortgage is distinct in some way.183 For these reasons, class action suits 
regarding the financial crisis have steadily declined since the initial uptick in claims 
in 2007, and most claims are no longer brought by sophisticated plaintiffs in their 
individual capacity.  
V. Conclusion 
The financial crisis of 2008 impacted billions worldwide, especially the U.S. financial 
sector and the American working class. The issuance of mortgage-backed securities, 
while meant to provide banks with the ability to help financially stable individuals 
with home financing, was taken advantage of by private-label issuers.184 Innovations 
within the mortgage market heightened the risk associated with MBS, and credit 
rating agencies failed to effectively value such securities.185 When the housing market 
 
 176. Id. at 1, 7.  
 177. Id. at 3.  
 178. Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).  
 179. Dugan, supra note 159, at 6.  
 180. Alexandra Yan, Introduction to Asset-Backed and Mortgage-Backed Securities, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/12/introduction-asset-backed-securities.asp (last visited April 24, 2017). 
 181. By the middle of 2009, the financial crisis had resulted in write-down losses exceeding $135 billion across 
a range of financial institutions. Dugan, supra note 159, at 6–7.  
 182. Id. at 7. 
 183. Slifkin, supra note 152, at 4. 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. Id. 
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collapsed in 2006, these risks and failures became apparent. The failures made by 
financial institutions led some to close their doors, while others became dependent 
on other institutions or the U.S. government.186 Aside from the economic impact of 
MBS, the landscape of securities litigation changed.187 Only time will tell what 
additional effects the use of mortgage-backed securities prior to 2008 will have on 
both the economy and the court system. All we know is that the securitization of 
residential mortgages by financial institutions was a chief culprit of the Financial 
Crisis of 2008. 
 
 
 186. See supra Part III.B. 
 187. See supra Part IV. 
